
## CS 161 Computer Security

## Q1 EvanBlock Cipher

## (24 points)

EvanBot invents a new block cipher chaining mode called the EBC (EvanBlock Cipher). The encryption diagram is shown below:



- Q1.1 (2 points) Write the encryption formula for  $C_i$ , where i > 1. You can use  $E_K$  and  $D_K$  to denote AES encryption and decryption respectively.
- Q1.2 (2 points) Write the decryption formula for  $P_i$ , where i > 1. You can use  $E_K$  and  $D_K$  to denote AES encryption and decryption respectively.
- Q1.3 (4 points) Select all true statements about this scheme.
  - □ It is IND-CPA secure if we use a random IV for every encryption.
  - ☐ It is IND-CPA secure if we use a hard-coded, constant IV for every encryption.
  - Encryption can be parallelized.
  - Decryption can be parallelized.
  - $\hfill\square$  None of the above

Q1.4 (4 points) Alice has a 4-block message  $(P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4)$ . She encrypts this message with the scheme and obtains the ciphertext  $C = (IV, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4)$ .

Mallory tampers with this ciphertext by changing the IV to 0. Bob receives the modified ciphertext  $C' = (0, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4)$ .

What message will Bob compute when he decrypts the modified ciphertext C'?

X represents some unpredictable "garbage" output of the AES block cipher.

- $O(P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4)$   $O(X, X, P_3, P_4)$  O(X, X, X, X)
- $\bigcirc (X, P_2, X, P_4) \qquad \bigcirc (X, P_2, P_3, P_4) \qquad \bigcirc \text{ None of the above}$

Alice has a 3-block message  $(P_1, P_2, P_3)$ . She encrypts this message with the scheme and obtains the ciphertext  $C = (IV, C_1, C_2, C_3)$ .

Mallory tampers with this ciphertext by swapping two blocks of ciphertext. Bob receives the modified ciphertext  $C' = (IV, C_2, C_1, C_3)$ .

When Bob decrypts the modified ciphertext C', he obtains some modified plaintext  $P' = (P'_1, P'_2, P'_3)$ . In the next three subparts, write expressions for  $P'_1, P'_2$ , and  $P'_3$ .

Q1.5 (4 points)  $P'_1$  is equal to these values, XORed together. Select as many options as you need.

For example, if you think  $P'_1 = P_1 \oplus C_2$ , then bubble in  $P_1$  and  $C_2$ .

$\square$ $P_1$	$\square$ $P_2$	$\square$ $P_3$	$\Box$ IV	$\square$ $C_1$	$\square$ $C_2$	$\Box$ $C_3$
Q1.6 (4 points) $P'_2$ is equal to these values, XORed together. Select as many options as you need.						
$\square$ $P_1$	$\square$ $P_2$	$\square$ $P_3$	$\Box$ IV	$\square$ $C_1$	$\square$ $C_2$	$\square$ $C_3$
Q1.7 (4 points) $P'_3$ is equal to these values, XORed together. Select as many options as you need.						
$\square$ $P_1$	$\square P_2$	$\square$ $P_3$	$\Box$ IV	$\square$ $C_1$	$\square$ $C_2$	$\square$ $C_3$

## Q2 AES-GROOT

(30 points)

Tony Stark develops a new block cipher mode of operation as follows:

 $C_0 = IV$   $C_1 = E_K(K) \oplus C_0 \oplus M_1$   $C_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus M_i$  $C = C_0 \|C_1\| \cdots \|C_n$ 

For all parts, assume that IV is randomly generated per encryption unless otherwise stated.

- Q2.1 (3 points) Write the decryption formula for  $M_i$  using AES-GROOT.
- Q2.2 (3 points) AES-GROOT is not IND-CPA secure. Which of the following most accurately describes a way to break IND-CPA for this scheme?
  - O It is possible to compute a deterministic value from each ciphertext that is the same if the first blocks of the corresponding plaintexts are the same.
  - $\bigcirc$   $C_1$  is deterministic. Two ciphertexts will have the same  $C_1$  if the first blocks of the corresponding plaintexts are the same.
  - **O** It is possible to learn the value of *K*, which can be used to decrypt the ciphertext.
  - $\bigcirc$  It is possible to tamper with the value of IV such that the decrypted plaintext block  $M_1$  is mutated in a predictable manner.
- Q2.3 (5 points) AES-GROOT is vulnerable to plaintext recovery of the first block of plaintext. Given a ciphertext C of an unknown plaintext M and different plaintext-ciphertext pair (M', C'), provide a formula to recover  $M_1$  in terms of  $C_i$ ,  $M'_i$ , and  $C'_i$  (for any i, e.g.  $C_0$ ,  $M'_2$ ,  $C'_6$ ).

Recall that the IV for some ciphertext C can be referred to as  $C_0$ .

If AES-GROOT is implemented with a fixed  $IV = 0^b$  (a fixed block of b 0's), the scheme is vulnerable to full plaintext recovery under the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) model. Given a ciphertext C of an unknown plaintext and different plaintext-ciphertext pair (M', C'), describe a method to recover plaintext block  $M_4$ .

Q2.4 (5 points) First, the adversary sends a value M'' to the challenger. Express your answer in terms of in terms of  $C_i$ ,  $M'_i$ , and  $C'_i$  (for any *i*).

Q2.5 (5 points) The challenger sends back the encryption of M'' as C''. Write an expression for  $M_4$  in terms of  $C_i$ ,  $M'_i$ ,  $C'_i$ ,  $M''_i$ , and  $C''_i$  (for any *i*).

- Q2.6 (4 points) Which of the following methods of choosing *IV* allows an adversary under CPA to fully recover an arbitrary plaintext (not necessarily using your attack from above)? Select all that apply.
  - $\Box$  *IV* is randomly generated per encryption
  - $\Box$  *IV* = 1<sup>*b*</sup> (the bit 1 repeated *b* times)
  - $\Box$  *IV* is a counter starting at 0 and incremented per encryption
  - $\Box$  *IV* is a counter starting at a randomly value chosen once during key generation and incremented per encryption
  - □ None of the above
- Q2.7 (2 points) Let C be the encryption of some plaintext M. If Mallory flips with the last bit of  $C_3$ , which of the following blocks of plaintext no longer decrypt to its original value? Select all that apply.
  - $\square M_1 \qquad \square M_3 \qquad \square \text{ None of the above}$
  - $\square$   $M_2$   $\square$   $M_4$

Q2.8 (3 points) Which of the following statements are true for AES-GROOT? Select all that apply.

- **Encryption** can be parallelized
- **D**ecryption can be parallelized
- □ AES-GROOT requires padding
- $\hfill\square$  None of the above