Question 1 ***A Tour of Tor***

As a reminder, when connecting to a normal website through Tor, your computer first queries the Tor "consensus" to get a list of all Tor nodes, and using this information it connects to the first Tor node and, from there, creates a circuit through the Tor network, eventually ending at an exit node.

Q1.1 (4 min) Consider the scenario where you are in a censored country and the censor choses not to block Tor, the censor is the adversary, and no Tor relays exist within this country. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to prevent the censor from blocking your traffic.

- ● One
- ○ Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ○ Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: The censor doesn't block Tor and the relay is outside of the country, so one hop will get you safely past the censor. The censor will see you sending packets to an encrypted Tor relay but will not be able to determine who you're actually communicating with.

This is equivalent to using a VPN where the VPN server is in a different country.

Q1.2 (4 min) Consider the scenario where you are the only user of Tor on a network that keeps detailed logs of all IPs contacted. You use Tor to email a threat. The network operator is made aware of this threat and that it was sent through Tor and probably originated on the operator's network. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee the network operator can't identify you as the one who sent the threat?

- ○ One
- ○ Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ● Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: Since you are the only user of Tor, the network operator just needs to look at the IP of the only person trying to connect to a Tor relay. The network operator can look through the list of IPs and see that you contacted a Tor relay regardless of how many relays you use.

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Q1.3 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identitity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to keep confidential from this node what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't know what sites you visit?

- ○ One
- ● Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ○ Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: If you only use a single relay, then if that relay is hostile they will be able to see your request and the site you're visiting. If you use two relays, the first relay cannot see your request, and the second can see your request but doesn't know who it's from. So in either case, you are protected.

In other words, if the second relay is positioned between you and the hostile node, the hostile node will not know the request originated from you since it only sees the incoming request coming from "that other node." If the second relay is positioned between the hostile node and your destination, then while the hostile node knows the request comes from you, it doesn't know the destination since it forwards the request to "that other node."

Q1.4 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there are mulitple independent hostile Tor nodes but you don't know their identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that every independent hostile node can't know what sites you visit?

- ○ One
- ● Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ○ Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: The solution is the same as the previous question. Since the hostile nodes are independent (non-colluding), it doesn't matter that there are multiple. No individual node can ever know both your identity and the request as long as you use at least two relays.

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Q1.5 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there are multiple colluding hostile Tor nodes but you don't know those nodes identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that the colluding system of hostile nodes can't know what sites you visit?

- ○ One
- ○ Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ● Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: Now, since the hostile nodes are colluding, you cannot ever be sure you are anonymous since you could get "unlucky" and have every node in your path be colluding hostile nodes.

Note that in real life, using three relays makes the probability of this happening negligible (assuming a certain amount of randomness in relay selection).

Q1.6 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to have data integrity for the HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't manipulate the data you receive from the sites you visit?

- ○ One
- ○ Two
- ○ Three
- ○ Four
- ● Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Solution: The exit node could modify the HTTP response without detection before forwarding the HTTP response to you.

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Question 2 ***Making New Friends***

Consider two local broadcast networks, as shown in the diagram below.



Q2.1 (2 min) Alice broadcasts an ARP request for Mallory's MAC address.

Which of these entities, if malicious, can poison Alice's ARP cache? Select all that apply.

■ Mallory ☐ Bob ☐ None of the above

■ Soda Hall's router ☐ Cory Hall's router

Solution: ARP is a local network protocol. The ARP broadcast is only sent to users on the local network, so only users on the local network can spoof an ARP response.

Q2.2 (4 min) Mallory and Bob form a TLS connection. Then, Bob adds a rule to the firewall disallowing all inbound packets from Mallory.

EvanBot argues that TLS messages are encrypted, so the firewall cannot stop Mallory from sending more TLS messages to Bob. Is EvanBot correct? Justify your answer in 10 words or fewer.

○ Yes ● No

Solution: No, because the IP header is not encrypted. TLS does not provide anonymity/availability.

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Q2.3 (3 min) Bob adds a rule to the firewall disallowing all inbound packets from anybody in Soda Hall's local network.

Which of the following attacks can Mallory still perform on Bob? Assume that Mallory cannot spoof packets. Select all that apply.

- [x] DoS
- [ ] TLS hijacking
- [x] XSS
- [ ] None of the above

Solution: Mallory could DoS Bob by overwhelming the firewall.

Mallory could perform a stored XSS attack on Bob by storing malicious JavaScript on an external web server. Bob then loads the JavaScript from the web server, not Mallory.

Mallory cannot hijack TLS regardless of the firewall.

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